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Recent Developments

Medtronic v. Lohr

I

n response to a conflict
among the circuits, the
United States Supreme Court, in
Medtronic v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240
(1996), addressed federal preemption of state tort suits for Class
III medical devices under the
Medical Device Amendments of
1976. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Stevens, held that the
Medical Device Amendments did
not pre-empt state negligent design
claims in product liability suits for
defective Class III medical devices, negligent manufacture or
labeling claims, and common-law
requirements that are substantial
equivalents of requirements under
federal law. With this decision,
the Court effectively eliminated
federal pre-emption of Class III
medical device products liability
cases, opening the door for
numerous state lawsuits. Moreover, although the application of
pre-emption principles to the Medical Device Amendments is clear
after Medtronic, the division of the
Court in the case suggests that the
scope of federal pre-emption of
common-law claims in other contexts is far from resolved.
In an attempt to alleviate public apprehension regarding medical
devices in the early 1970s, Congress passed the Medical Device
Amendments Act of 1976
("MDA"). The MDA grouped
these devices into three classes.
Since Class III devices were
deemed to pose the most potential
danger to the public, they had to
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meet the most stringent requirements in order to receive approval
from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). The FDA required Class III devices to pass a
strict
"premarket
approval"
("PMA") to insure the device's
safety and effectiveness. Congress, however, created two exceptions to the PMA requirement because of the sheer number of already existing devices and the time
involved in the FDA approval process. Those exceptions allowed
any pre-1976 Class III device or
substantial equivalent to be sold
with far less burdensome requirements until the FDA could rule on
the PMA.
In October of 1982, Medtronic,
a manufacturer of medical devices,
notified the FDA that it planned to
sell the Model 4011 pacemaker
lead, a part of the pacemaker that
transmits electric impulses to the
heart. Pursuant to the "substantial
equivalent" exception created by
the MDA, the FDA granted temporary approval of the device, allowing Medtronic to put the pace-

makers with the Model 4011 leads
on the market. In 1987, Lora Lohr
("Lohr") received a pacemaker
with the Medtronic lead to regulate
her heartbeat. When the pacemaker lead failed several years
later, Mrs. Lohr suffered injury to
her heart that resulted in emergency surgery.
The Lohrs then sued Medtronic
for negligence and strict liability in
Florida state court in 1993. The
case was removed to federal district court on Medtronic' s motion
where the district court found their
state law claims pre-empted and
dismissed the Lohrs' complaint.
On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed in part and affirmed in
part, holding that the negligent
design claims were not preempted, but the negligent manufacturing and failure to warn
claims were pre-empted by FDA
regulations. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the
pre-emption issue.
The Court began by discussing
two general principles about federal pre-emption. First, in deference to the boundaries of federalism, the Court emphasized that a
state law based on its police power
would not be pre-empted unless it
was the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Medtronic,
116 S. Ct. at 2250. Second, the
Court underscored the importance
of discerning congressional purpose in the particular context of a
pre-emption case, to determine the
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 39
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existence and scope of federal preemption. Id To ascertain congressional intent, the Court stated
that it must analyze not only the
statutory language of the preemption statute itself, but must
also consider the pre-emption language within the framework of the
entire statute. Id at 2250-51.
Speaking for only a plurality of
four justices, Justice Stevens discussed the issue of whether 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a) pre-empted all
common-law claims. The plurality
based its reasoning on statutory
language, legislative history, and
in particular, the purpose of the
statute. Id at 2251-53. Section
360k(a) states in pertinent part:
[N]o State ... may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a [medical]
device intended for human
use any requirement (1)
which is different from, or
in addition to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the
safety or effectiveness of
the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device under this chapter.
Id at 2248-49. The plurality rejected Medtronic's blanket assertion that any state common-law
claim would qualify as a "requirement . . . different from, or in
addition to" existing FDA regulations for purposes of pre-emption
under the statute. Id at 2251. The
plurality
found
Medtronic' s
position particularly unconvincing
because it effectively would have
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 40

deprived a plaintiff injured by a
medical device of any remedy. Id
Federal pre-emption would not
permit relief for the injured party
under state tort law, and federal
law would not grant relief because
the MDA has no provision for a
private cause of action. ld Congress, the plurality reasoned, could
not have intended such an unjust
result when, ostensibly, the purpose of the statute was to protect
consumers from defective medical
devices. Id.
The plurality referred to interpretations of the term "requirements" in other contexts as support
for its conclusion that the "requirements" in § 360k(a) did not
encompass
all
common-law
claims. The plurality distinguished the Court's previous holding in
Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504 (1992) that a "statute
pre-empting certain state 'requirements' could also pre-empt
common-law damages claims,"
stressing that the interpretation of
requirements in the statute in that
case did not preclude all commonlaw claims. Medtronic at 2251. In
contrast, in this case, the effects of
adopting Medtronic's interpretation of the statute would result in
exclusion of all common-law
claims. Id.
Justice Breyer added a fifth
vote and joined the opinion of the
Court in discussing the specific
question of whether the Lohrs'
common-law claims were preempted. Id at 2254. The Court
addressed Medtronic' s argument
that an FDA substantial equivalent
determination for the pacemaker

lead constituted a "requirement"
that pre-empted the Lohrs' negligent design claim. Id In holding
that a substantial equivalent determination was not a "requirement"
that pre-empted the negligent design claim, the Court reasoned that
the determination did not amount
to FDA approval because the lead
was still required to pass the eventual premarket approval for Class
III medical devices. Id Nor did a
substantial equivalent classification provide any protection to the
public.
Instead, by requiring
Medtronic to follow "good manufacturing practices," and to list and
label such devices, the classification merely allowed Medtronic to
compete with exempt pre-1976
medical devices. Id
Next, the Court reached the
Lohrs' identity of requirements
claims. Id at 2255. Although §
360k pre-empts state causes of
action that create additional "requirements" from FDA regulations, the Court was unwilling to
find that a damages action seeking
to enforce an FDA regulation was
an additional requirement. Id In
order to be pre-empted, the Court
noted that there must be state law
claims that are "different from or
in addition to" the FDA requirements. Id Unlike federal law,
Florida law requires negligence to
be proven to recover damages in
labeling or manufacturing claims.
Id The Court, however, stated
that this requirement, while technically different from the FDA, was
insufficient to trigger pre-emption.
Id In the Court's view, state requirements that made it more diffi-
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cult for a plaintiff to recover damages were not pre-empted by §
360k. Id. As a further justification
for its conclusion, the Court emphasized that in determining the
scope of pre-emption, courts must
look to FDA regulations. Id. Here,
the Court stated that FDA regulations supported the Lohrs' position. Id. at 2256.
Next, the Court noted that the
FDA did promulgate federal requirements for the labeling and
manufacture of medical devices,
and the Court acknowledged that
these regulations constituted requirements. Id. Nevertheless, the
Court considered the general nature of the regulations insufficient
to pre-empt state common-law
claims in this case. Id. Section
360k(a)(1) requires that the federal
requirement must be "applicable to
the device," and under FDA regulations, "preempt state law only if
they are specific counterpart regulations or specific to a particular
device." Id. at 2257. In this case,
the Court, after comparing the
state and federal requirements,
held that the manufacturing and
labeling claims were not preempted because common-law tort
actions were not developed specifically "with respect to" medical
devices. Id. at 2258.
Finally, the Court refused to
respond to the Lohrs' assertion that
§ 360k never pre-empts commonlaw claims. Id. at 2258. The
Court concluded that it was unnecessary to reach this issue because
none of the claims in the case had
been pre-empted. Id. at 2259. The
Court stated in dicta, however, that

it would be "rare indeed" to find
pre-emption of common-law
claims under the statute. Id.
Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion stressed that the MDA
could sometimes pre-empt a state
law tort suit. Id. As support, Justice Breyer cited the Court's decision in Cipollone. Id. He rejected
the plurality's distinctions between
the meaning of "requirements" in
the context of § 360k and the
meaning of requirements in the
Cipollone statute. Id. at 2262.
Justice O'Connor concurred in
part and dissented in part. She
concluded that state common-law
causes of action were "requirements" under the statute and would
therefore be pre-empted where
such requirements differed from
the MDA. Id. Although Justice
O'Connor agreed that the negligent design claims and violation of
federal requirements claims were
not pre-empted, she argued that the
labeling and manufacturing claims
should have been pre-empted because they created requirements
"different from and in addition to"
the federal requirements. Jd. at
2264.
In Medtronic v. Lohr, the
Supreme Court gave control of
common-law product liability lawsuits for defective medical devices
back to the States, and effectively
eliminated one of the only defenses left for medical device manufacturers. If the cost of defending
these actions becomes prohibitively high, the practical result
may be a halt in the advances in
technology for medical devices.
Additionally, the differing opin-

ions of the Supreme Court in this
case raise the question of when, if
ever, common-law claims will be
pre-empted in the future.
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